



Thank you for taking the time to complete the Transformational Safety® Collective Mindfulness (HRO) Personal Awareness Instrument. This is the Personal Development Edition so it may take you some time to reflect on the learnings that come as part of the process. Remember it is only of value if you are brutally honest in your responses. You gain nothing by pretending. This tool shall enable you to gain a basic understanding of where you see yourself placed against the five (5) hallmarks of HRO.

Please rate your level of agreement with each of the following statements.

- 1 = Strongly Agree
- 2 = Agree
- 3 = Neither Agree nor Disagree
- 4 = Disagree
- 5 = Strongly Disagree

SECTION ONE:

- | | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
|--|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. When things seem out of place I really try to make things right. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I express great interest in learning about how other jobs/processes are done around here. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. I speak to someone about how things are going within the business, at least daily. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. If we have an incident here I really personally want to know why it happened. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

SECTION TWO:

- | | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. If I am not sure about something I am quick to seek out somebody with greater experience. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I honestly respect people here for themselves and the expertise they are willing to share. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. I believe that everyone here has a unique contribution to our successes within the business. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. I know that people have high regard for my own contributions by the way they approach me. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

SECTION THREE:

- | | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
|--|--------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. When things go wrong around here I really work hard to make sure we can bounce back. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I have had some real challenges in my life and always seem to find a path to succeed. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. Others would describe me as a bit of a risk-taker when it comes to problem solving. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. I really try to think "outside the square" when dealing with stuff at this place. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

SECTION FOUR:

- | | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. I do spend time thinking about what might go wrong with process and how to fix it. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I am always looking around for the "little things" that just might lead to a problem. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. I spend time on scenario planning and like to think I am well prepared if things going wrong. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. Some people think we should only "think positive" - I believe system failures are when we learn. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

SECTION FIVE:

- | | <u>1</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>3</u> | <u>4</u> | <u>5</u> |
|---|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. I never focus on the quickest and easiest solution to a problem. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 2. I encourage everyone around me to ask the tough questions during discussions about safety, change etc. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 3. If I want to simplify a process I need to have really done the homework to have any chance at all. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |
| 4. I really believe you need to have some well thought through reasoning before we make any change here. | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> | <input type="checkbox"/> |

Individual Scoring

Add up your scores for each of the Sections and write the results in the boxes provided.

- Section One (Sensitivity to Operations): =
- Section Two (Deference to Expertise): =
- Section Three (Commitment toward Resilience): =
- Section Four (Pre-occupation with Failure): =
- Section Five (Reluctance to Simplify): =


You now plot your raw scores on the Collective Mindfulness (HRO) Grid. Be careful you plot the correct results against each Collective Mindfulness (HRO) descriptor.

The optimal Collective Mindfulness (HRO) descriptors consistently demonstrate thoughts and behaviours in the green (best practice) zones. Amber zones are acceptable (good practice); although you should always be striving for green. Red zones are danger zones. You would prefer not to be here!

For a detailed description of the Transformational Safety Culture Improvement System and the Collective Mindfulness Safety descriptors® visit www.transformationalsafety.com

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What does it all mean?

The Transformational Safety® Collective Mindfulness (HRO) Personal Awareness Instrument has been specifically developed as a companion tool to the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey. Whilst the Transformational Safety® Culture Survey provides a very empirically sound and detailed analysis of the contemporary safety culture operating within a business, the Transformational Safety® Collective Mindfulness (HRO) Personal Awareness Instrument allows individuals to gain a personal understanding of where they see their organisation placed against the five (5) hallmarks of High Reliability Organizing (HRO).

Evidence shows that the consistent application of the HRO Hallmarks (within the green zones) acts as an enormously significant contribution towards the development and sustainability of positive safety decisions/behaviours within all operations. It does so by maximizing the likelihood of identifying toxic system deviations early (at the point of “just discernible”), and applying “positive variance” to bring things back toward a safety aware balance. The application of the HRO Hallmarks can add a level of flexibility and adaptability to an organisation, leading them toward the goal of “living resilience” within their underlying safety culture.

Here are some descriptions of what the HRO Hallmarks represent.

Sensitivity to operations:

Everyone needs to be constantly aware of how processes and systems affect the organisation. In a resilient safety culture, each and every employee pays close attention to operations, and maintains an acute awareness as to what is or isn't working. There are no assumptions here.

This steady concentration on surroundings and processes (we might call this situational awareness) leads to observations that inform decision-making and new operational initiatives. Most people just “know” when the temperature has fallen by as little as one degree – it just feels “different”. Whilst there is a sensitivity borne of experience and training, there can also be a sensitivity borne of instinct – it just “feels off”. In a resilient safety culture we respect that “sensitivity” no matter where it has come from.

Deference to expertise: In a resilient safety culture there shall be an overt recognition as to where the expertise lies. More often than not, it means recognizing that those closest to the “frontline” are the experts, and providing them with the skill, resources, and delegation to make decisions when a critical issue arises shall often result in quicker mitigation of harm.

In a resilient safety culture, senior leaders are conducting frequent SAFE-T-WALKS to reinforce safety behaviours and find and fix critical safety issues. These senior leaders are generally quite naïve when it comes to recognising “pointy-end” safety issues. They are reliant upon sourcing this information from the “experts”. This means they must create a climate of openness and sharing in their communications with operational staff.

When senior leaders are in operational review meetings, they should “lead with their ears”. It is all about listening intently to all that is going on around them, and using their own position within the organisation to remove speed bumps that might be getting in the way of resilient performance.

Commitment towards resilience: Having a commitment towards resilience means being prepared for whatever. In a resilient safety culture we accept that “bad stuff” is going to happen sometime. The frequency and magnitude are actually unknown, but it is inevitable. The difference is that we are actually prepared for it. When it does happen we have drills and practices in place that allow both the organisation (and its people) to feel secure in the knowledge that the path to return and recovery is “in place”. This means that a resilient safety culture shall train, train, and train some more. It shall train its people in those areas such as personal stress management/resiliency skills, organisational trauma recovery, etc.

Pre-occupation with failure: Every employee, irrespective of where they may sit or stand in a high reliability organization, is actively encouraged to think of ways their work processes might break down. This sense of shared “unease” is constant. It is applied to both small inconsequential deviations, as well as major system failures. Everyone is actively encouraged to share their concerns for potential failures as often as they become noticed. This then contributes toward a greater commitment toward resilience as they are “listened” to and “acted” upon.

Everyone is focused on errors and near-misses, learning from them and figuring out how to prevent them from happening again. In a resilient safety culture that embraces RE and HRO we see error as a fait accompli. It is always present, so attention to detail is crucial. Locating potential systems failures is an opportunity for improvement.

Reluctance to simplify: High reliability organizations just refuse to simplify interpretations. It can so often be much easier to do so. How often have you seen an accident investigation which concludes either “human error” or “retraining required”? An HRO would reject such a conclusion, and say “go away and come back when you are serious”.

The inherent levels of information uncertainty and ambiguity that exist within all systems require an ability to explore/understand complex problems without reducing and oversimplifying them.

In short, a reluctance to simplify refers to a deliberate attempt to create a very rounded picture of the process and the work environment. What this means is that everyone takes the time to really understand what is happening in their area.

Being reluctant to simply requires constantly asking the “why” question and inviting others with diverse experience to express their own opinions. The underlying belief here is that the more you’re immersed in something, the harder it is for you to objectively observe and question things that need questioning. In the world of safety, we might sometimes refer to this as risk

blindness. Whilst there is nothing intrinsically wrong with trying to make a process “simpler”, there is an enormous risk that in doing so you remove some of the “redundancies” that have been placed within that system. This has become a more genuine threat as the thinking behind “lean manufacturing” begins to impact safety thinking. So the position is to always be “reluctant”. Does not mean you don’t do it, just means your only do so in a very thorough and informed manner.


Developmental Opportunities



The Transformational Safety® Collective Mindfulness (HRO) Personal Awareness Instrument is an excellent tool to allow individuals to gain significant understandings toward the HRO maturity within their own organisations, and also how they are personally influencing that maturity.

You achieve this goal by having a closer look at the Scoring Matrix on page three (3). In all cases you are wanting to see the results for each of the five (5) HRO Hallmarks sitting inside the green zone. We describe this as being “seen in the green”. At no stage do you want to see your results in the “red zone”. We describe this as being “dead in the red”.

For example, consider the result matrix of Jack Cullinan. A profile like this one shows that you do not see the HRO culture of your work environment to be all that positive. Certainly there are a couple of Hallmarks that are “on the green”, and that should be celebrated. “Deference to Expertise” and “Commitment toward Resilience” are both trending toward the “dead zone”. Reluctance to simplify is well in the “dead zone”. There is clearly some “work” to be done here.



This scoring matrix can also show some of your own behaviours that are both influencing, and/or weakening, the journey toward a resilient HRO safety culture. So the key question here is what can, or should, be done to make this workplace, and your contribution to it, a safer culture to work within. The answer to this question is really not all that difficult – it lies within the items that you have actually already considered. For example, you can see that Jack Cullinan has placed his workplace, and his role within it, squarely within the lethal safety culture red zone (dead in the red) for the HRO Hallmark “Reluctance to Simplify”.. You already know this is a very dangerous place to be.

So, let's assume that you do actually recognise this, and wish to do all that you can to contribute toward getting "out of here". So this is what you do:-

- Go back to Section Five (Reluctance to Simplify) of the Transformational Safety® Collective Mindfulness (HRO) personal Awareness Instrument and review the items within that Section and how you responded to them. Within this Section we actually want you to be strongly disagreeing with the items. The fact that you felt unable to do so is the reason why you ended up "in the red". So let's take a closer look at your actual responses to Section Five.

SECTION FIVE:		<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>
1.	I never focus on the quickest and easiest solution to a problem.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
2.	I encourage everyone around me to ask the tough questions during discussions about safety, change etc.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
3.	If I want to simplify a process I need to have really done the homework to have any chance at all.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
4.	I really believe you need to have some well thought through reasoning before we make any change here.	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

For each item within Section Five (Reluctance to Simplify) you can see that the responses fall outside the target zone. Consider for a moment Jack Cullinan's response to Item 3. He has "disagreed" with the statement:-

- "If I want to simplify a process, I need to have really done the homework to have any chance at all".
 You can see that the optimal responses for this item are either "strongly agree" or "agree". Any response, other than these two (2), takes Jack toward the amber or red zones. There are then two factors embedded within Item 3. They are actually quite overt. There are no "tricks" here. Item 3 guides Jack to being required to have done adequate research (homework) before there can be any simplification of a process. This item points not only to the amount of research (homework) that Jack has done, it also highlights an "expectation" within the organisation. So it stands to reason that for Jack, and the organization he is reflecting on, to continue a direction toward a resilient HRO safety culture he needs to become part of a process that encourages the "expectation" that anyone who wishes to see a change in procedure/process with the organization, must have done extensive research (homework) prior to any "change" being given due consideration. As I hope you can see, this is not difficult.

Consider the response provided at Item 1.

- "I never focus on the quickest and easiest solution to a problem."
 Again you can see that the preferred response is toward the agreement side of the equation. We do not want people within the organization to go for the simplest, easiest, or quickest solution to any problem. Now let's be a little careful here. You shall note that the item does not, in any way, suggest there should be unnecessary layers of complexity. In traditional safety language this item might be thought of as interrogating the concept of the "short cut".

My Resilient Transformational Safety® Culture – HRO Development Plan


Insert your passport size photo here

“I recognise that Rome was not built in a day. To that end I commit to deliberately and strategically endeavouring to implement, more consistently, the High Reliability Organizing (HRO) Hallmarks (behaviours) that are written below.

I recognise that there shall be ups and downs on this journey toward a resilient safety culture and that is OK. That’s the way the real world spins. What is important is that I shall continue investing the effort in influencing HRO Hallmark behaviours in the direction that is going to help me provide a positive, sustainable and mindful influence on those around me.

At the end of the day I know that I shall be making a personal contribution to the safety of myself, and those around me. I shall also be directly contributing to the development of a resilient safety culture within my business. If that contribution leads to the saving of one life, or the avoidance of any injury, then all my efforts have been worth it.”

On the Radar Plot below transfer your Collective Mindfulness (HRO) scores from page three (3). You shall be able to clearly visualise which HRO Hallmarks require your attention. Remember that this is all about using your influencing skills both within the organization itself, as well as being aware of your own HRO Hallmark behaviours.



The graphical interpretation above outlines exactly where I am currently, and where I aim to see myself, and my organisation – one day. I shall get there by doing a bit less of this, and a bit more of that – and actively encouraging those around me to do the same.

I recognise that I cannot do this all at once. To that end I have prioritised the order on which I shall commence implementing my resilient HRO safety culture evolution.

In order to keep on track, I have made a few notes below outlining how I shall begin to enhance each of the HRO Hallmarks towards the target zones.

Sensitivity to operations:

- I need to do more of:
- a).....
 - b).....
 - c).....

- I need to do less of:
- a).....
 - b).....
 - c).....

Deference to expertise:

I need to do more of: a).....
b).....
c).....

I need to do less of: a).....
b).....
c).....

Tendency toward resilience:

I need to do more of: a).....
b).....
c).....

I need to do less of: a).....
b).....
c).....

Preoccupation with failure:

I need to do more of: a).....
b).....
c).....

I need to do less of: a).....
b).....
c).....

Reluctance to simplify:

I need to do more of: a).....
b).....
c).....

I need to do less of: a).....
b).....
c).....

